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THE EXPANSION OF STATUTORY SUBJECT MATTER
UNDER THE 1952 PATENT ACTg
Robert Greene Sterne and Lawrence B. Bugaisky¼

I. EXPANSION OF STATUTORY SUBJECT MATTER UNDER THE 1952
PATENT ACT
It is quite surprising that a mere four words were sufficient to
establish a fundamental framework for defining the categories of
patentable inventions. This framework has successfully stood for a
period of more than 200 years. The 1793 Patent Act1 defined the four
classes of statutory subject matter as “art, machine, manufacture, or
composition.”2 The 1952 Patent Act (“Patent Act” or “1952 Act”)3
replaced the term “art” with “process,” resulting in the current language
of 35 U.S.C. § 101.4
The legislative history of the Patent Act states that “art” as used in
§ 101: “is interpreted by the courts to be practically synonymous with
g

This paper was originally presented at the Fifth Annual Richard C. Sughrue Symposium
on Intellectual Property Law and Policy on March 10, 2003. A database search has not found any
significant decisions concerning statutory subject matter that have been decided since the original
presentation. An electronic version of the paper has been posted on the Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein
& Fox, P.L.L.C., web site (www.skgf.com).
¼
Robert Greene Sterne and Lawrence B. Bugaisky, Ph.D. are Directors with Sterne,
Kessler, Goldstein & Fox, P.L.L.C., a Washington, D.C., intellectual property firm
(www.skgf.com). The authors express their appreciation for research assistance to Joe Ostroff and
for the editorial assistance provided by Ken Bass of their firm. This paper is intended to give an
overview of the current state of the law and some discussion of how the authors believe future
trends may develop. The paper does not represent the views of the law firm or any of its present or
former clients. Copyright  2003 SKGF. All Rights Reserved.
1. The Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318. The 1793 Act was the successor to the
first United States Patent Act of 1790. 1 Stat. 109. There were subsequent patent statutes in 1836
(Act of July 4, 1836), 5 Stat. 117; 1870, 16 Stat. 198; and 1874, 18 Stat. 78.
2. These categories were maintained through the subsequent Patent Acts until 1952. 29 Stat.
692; 32 Stat. 1225; 45 Stat. 732; 46 Stat. 37; 53 Stat. 1212.
3. 66 Stat. 797 (Act of July 19, 1952).
4. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2002). “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” Id.
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process or method. The word ‘process’5 has been used to avoid the
necessity of explanation that the word ‘art’ as used in this place means
‘process or method.’”6
Despite the absence of any substantial change in the statutory
language, there has been a substantial expansion of the subject matter
being claimed in issued U.S. patents over the last 50 years. This
expansion is the result of judicial interpretation of the essentially
unchanged language of the Patent Act, and administrative guidelines
from the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
The expansion of statutory subject matter appears to have been
driven by two mutually reinforcing factors. The first one, of course, is
the accelerating pace of invention as technology continues to rapidly
advance. More importantly, however, is the fact that the 1952 Act did
not include any express exclusionary limits on statutory subject matter.7
One of the landmark cases concerning statutory subject matter was
the 1980 Supreme Court decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty8 that
upheld the patentability of genetically engineered oil-eating bacteria.
That decision resulted, at least in part, from the absence of express
exclusionary language in the Patent Act. The Court noted that “[i]n
choosing such expansive terms as ‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of
matter,’ modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly
contemplated that the patent laws be given wide scope.”9
In Chakrabarty, the Court further stated that “Congress employed
broad general language in drafting [the Patent Act] precisely because . . .
inventions are often unforeseeable.”10 Referring to the legislative
history, the Court suggested that statutory subject matter should include
“anything under the sun that is made by man.”11 After Chakrabarty,
5. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2002) further defines a process to mean “process, art or method.”
6. S. Rep. No. 82-1979 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2398-99.
7. While 35 U.S.C. § 101 does not specifically exclude specific types of subject matter as
being non-statutory, the courts have. For example, included in non-statutory subject matter are laws
of nature, physical phenomena, a conceptual energy model and abstract ideas. See In re Bonczyk,
No. 01-1061, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 9256 (Fed Cir. May 11, 2001); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584
(1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 66 (1972); Funk Bros. Seed. Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S.
127, 130 (1948). Additional types of matter considered non-statutory by the courts include merely
an idea, a principle in the abstract, an original cause, and a motive. See Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v.
Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874); LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1853).
8. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980) (describing the subject matter at issue
as a “genetically engineered bacterium capable of breaking down multiple components of crude oil.
Because of this property . . . Chakrabarty’s invention is believed to have significant value for the
treatment of oil spills.”)
9. Id at 308.
10. Id at 316.
11. Id at 310 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394).
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reference to statutory subject matter and “anything under the sun”
appeared frequently in decisions.12 Thus, the absence of any express
limitations on the four statutory categories has been the second basis for
significant judicial expansion of allowable subject matter.
One year after Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court in Diamond v.
Diehr13 considered a completely different technology: a “process”
carried out using a computer with a stored program.14 As in
Chakrabarty, the Court stated that “we have more than once cautioned
that ‘courts should not read into the patent laws limitations and
conditions which a legislature has not expressed.’”15 As a result, the
process was found to be within the bounds of allowable statutory subject
matter.
The approach to patentable subject matter taken in the European
Patent Convention contrasts starkly with that in the United States. The
Convention16 expressly excludes numerous categories of subject matter:
(a) mere discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical models, (b)
aesthetic creations, (c) schemes, rules and methods for performing
mental acts, playing games or doing business and programs for
computers, (d) presentation of information, (e) methods of treatment of
the human or animal body, and (f) plant or animal varieties or essentially
biological processes for the production of plants or animals.17 Needless
to say, this results in a decreased diversity in the types of subject matter
12. See State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
1998); Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425 (B.P.A.I. 1987).
13. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 182 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980)).
16. European Patent Convention, Article 52 (1, 2 and 4). The Convention states:
Patentable Inventions.
(1) European patents shall be granted for any inventions which are susceptible of
industrial application, which are new and which involve an inventive step.
(2) The following in particular shall not be regarded as inventions with the meaning of
paragraph 1: (a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods; (b) aesthetic
creation; (c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or
doing business, and programs for computers; (d) presentations of information . . . .
...
(4) Methods for treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy and
diagnostic methods practiced on the human or animal body shall not be regarded as
invention which are susceptible of industrial application . . . European Patent
Convention, Article 53 (b), Exceptions to Patentability. European patents shall not be
granted in respect of: . . . (b) plant or animal varieties or essentially biological processes
for the production of plants or animals; this provision does not apply to microbiological
processes to the products thereof.
Id.
17. Id.
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found patentable compared to U.S. practice.18
Issues concerning statutory subject matter first arise during ex parte
proceedings in the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). If
a claim is not rejected on grounds of unallowable statutory subject
matter by an examiner, the claimed subject matter becomes allowable
statutory subject matter by administrative default. In contrast, if the
claim is rejected by the PTO and later considered on judicial review of
the PTO rejection, additional statutory subject matter is in effect brought
within the words of the Patent Act by judicial interpretation.
Alternatively, it is possible that a claim that has been allowed by the
PTO will be challenged after examination during infringement litigation
on the grounds that it encompasses subject matter that is not within the
language of the Patent Act.
Statutory subject matter rejections have been raised by examiners
against many different kinds of inventions including, but not limited to:
medical treatment claims,19 printed matter,20 computer software,21
business methods,22 kits,23 genetically-altered microorganisms,24
intermediary or transitory products in compositions,25 and plant seeds.26
Of course, this list is not all-inclusive. In some instances, the so-called
non-statutory subject matter became patentable after further
consideration of examiners’ decisions by the courts or changes in the
PTO rules.
The concept of statutory subject matter has sometimes become
muddy because in a number of instances the PTO has rejected claims for
lack of statutory matter, when in fact the rejection should have been
based on other provisions of the Patent Act. These additional reasons
for rejection include, but are not limited to, issues concerning

18. There is some commonality with regard to fundamental ideas, algorithms and other
categories excluded from patenting in the United States as a result of judicial decisions. See supra
note 8.
19. Ex parte Scherer, 103 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 107 (B.P.A.I. 1954). While surgical techniques
are considered patentable subject matter, Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2001) (110 Stat.
3009, September 30, 1996), providing remedies against medical practitioner and related health
entities performing such an activity.
20. See In re Jones, 373 F.2d 1007 (C.C.P.A. 1967); In re Miller, 418 F.2d 1392, (C.C.P.A.
1969).
21. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
22. State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1368.
23. In re Venezia, 530 F.2d 956 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
24. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1981).
25. In re Breslow, 616 F.2d 516 (C.C.P.A.1980).
26. Pioneer Hi-Bred. Int’l Inc. v. J.E.M. Agric. Supply, 200 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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enablement, written description, novelty and obviousness.27
Analytically, these additional requirements do not function as narrowing
restrictions on the classes of statutory matter. Rather, the additional
restrictions impose tests that the application must pass once it has passed
through the initial door to patentability: meeting the statutory subject
matter requirement.
This article is not intended to provide a complete review of all cases
involving the expansion of statutory subject matter since enactment of
the 1952 Act.28 The attached table does, however, list a number of
significant cases, and a few of these are briefly discussed below.
II. ALGORITHMS, SOFTWARE AND COMPUTER-RELATED ISSUES
The law concerning the patentability of computer-related inventions
and whether they are statutory matter has undergone a series of changes
since the passage of the 1952 Act. While the Supreme Court has not
expressly overruled its prior decisions, an observer can readily conclude
that the Justices have changed the scope of patentable subject matter in
this area. A series of decisions29 has resulted in an evolution away from
an apparent absolute bar on patenting anything relating in any way to an
algorithm. This evolution now provides principles that allow patenting
of such subject matter if there is a practical application for the algorithm
or if it is associated with a tangible medium.
Algorithms per se have long been held not to be statutory subject
matter and the 1972 Supreme Court decision in Gottschalk v. Benson30
essentially precluded patent protection for software per se, on the
grounds that software programs are essentially only a collection of
algorithms. The Court, however, left the door open for the patenting of
novel and non-obvious programming methods as well as software that
was embodied in or used in connection with a mechanical device.31
One example of the patenting of software that was associated with a
machine was the automatic record-keeping system that banks could use
to provide bookkeeping services on their statements that was considered

27. These other provisions include 35 U.S.C.S. § 102 (2002); 35 U.S.C. §§ 103, 112 (2002).
28. Extensive detailed treatment of statutory subject matter can be found in several treatises,
such as D.S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.01 (2002); M.A. ADELMAN, PATENT LAW
PERSPECTIVES § 1.01 (2d ed. 2002).
29. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1981); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994);
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
30. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 72-73.
31. Id. at 73.
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in In re Johnston.32 Those claims were allowed because they were
drawn to a description of a machine that was controlled by an
appropriately programmed digital computer rather than being drawn to
the computer program itself.33 Similarly, a method for curing rubber that
used as one of its steps a mathematical formula and a programmed
computer was found to be patentable subject matter in Diamond v
Diehr,34 where the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals’35 conclusion that patentability of the process should not
be defeated merely because a mathematical formula was used.
In 1994, the Federal Circuit described the concept of statutory
subject matter for computer-related inventions as follows:
[T]he proper inquiry in dealing with the so called mathematical subject
matter exception to [patentability] is to see whether the claimed subject
matter as a whole is a disembodied mathematical concept, whether
categorized as a mathematical formula, mathematical equation,
mathematical algorithm, or the like, which in essence represents
nothing more than a ‘law of nature,’ ‘natural phenomenon,’ or
‘abstract idea.’ If so, Diehr precludes the patenting of that subject
matter.
...
. . . This is not a disembodied mathematical concept which may be
characterized as an ‘abstract idea,’ but rather a specific machine to
produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result.36

The evolving justification for allowing patents for device-connected
software, while disallowing them for software per se, formed the basis
for the appeal in In re Beauregard.37 In that case, IBM challenged the
PTO’s rejection of an application to patent software in the form of a
program stored on computer media.38 IBM argued for an extension of
the existing principles.39 After IBM’s brief was filed, the Commissioner
of Patents decided to issue new examination guidelines for computer

32. In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765 (C.C.P.A. 1974), rev’d on other grounds Dann v. Johnston,
425 U.S. 219 (1976).
33. Id. at 771.
34. Dier, 450 U.S. at 192-93.
35. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was the predecessor to the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
36. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
37. In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
38. Id.
39. Id.
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software.40 These new guidelines opened the existing doorway to
patentability so wide that inventors can now, in effect, patent any
computer software provided that it is embodied in a medium such as a
diskette.41 That change, for all practical purposes, reversed the result of
the Gottschalk decision.
III. PRINTED MATTER ISSUES
Printed matter has historically not been considered statutory subject
matter. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), however, in
1967 drew a distinction between “printed matter,” which has the primary
purpose of conveying information to a reader, and “pattern areas” on a
disc which actually functioned as a “structure.”42 The court further
stated that it was “error to confuse the lines of a patent drawing . . . with
functional elements of a mechanism which in use actuate other
mechanisms.”43 Thus, while both algorithms per se and printed matter
per se had been held outside the bounds of statutory subject matter,
when either was used in a framework associated with a physical
structure, they were found to be patentable statutory subject matter.
IV. BUSINESS METHODS
A “business method,” which in the past had been considered nonstatutory either because it was printed matter or software, has recently
been found to be statutory subject matter in State Street Bank.44 There,
the Federal Circuit decided that determination of whether claims “are
directed to subject matter within 35 U.S.C. § 101 should not turn on
whether the claimed subject matter does ‘business’ instead of something
else.”45
V. BIOTECHNOLOGY AND CHEMICAL RELATED ISSUES
The modern era of biotechnology patenting opened with the 1980
Chakrabarty46 decision that genetically manipulated bacteria was
40. Examination Guidelines for Computer Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478, 7479
(1996).
41. Beauregard, 53 F.3d at 1584.
42. In re Jones, 373 F.2d 1007, 1012 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (stating that “a dark area on a light base
can be an element of structure”).
43. Id. at 1013.
44. State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
45. Id. at 1377.
46. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1981).
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statutory subject matter.
Subsequently, numerous biotechnology
inventions, never previously deemed patentable, were granted patents.47
As with other technologies, the patenting of biotechnology inventions
has been facilitated by the Federal Circuit’s narrow interpretation of
potentially excludable matter.48
The patenting of multicellular organisms had been an issue for
some time, when in 1987, the PTO position on this matter was clarified49
in an Official Gazette Notice and in 1988 when the “Harvard Mouse”
became the first patented mammal.50 Today, patentable biotechnology
includes genetically manipulated animals such as rats, pigs, sheep, and
even genetically manipulated foods such as tomatoes, rice and corn.
In general, determination of whether something in the
biotechnology area falls within the parameters of statutory subject matter
has not required further major decisions by the courts, but simply
application of precedential decisions such as Chakrabarty. One
temporary exception to the trend of allowing patents under the Patent
Act concerned multicellular plants which were initially considered to be
non-allowable subject matter under § 101 because there were other
statutes covering this intellectual property.51 A 1985 PTO decision52 and
the 2000 Federal Circuit decision of Pioneer Hi-Bred53 clarified the
issue and established that multicellular plants are indeed patentable
subject matter under § 101.54
The chemical area has also presented unique issues in terms of
statutory subject matter. The CCPA decision of In re Breslow55
addressed the issue of whether an intermediary or transitory product
could be considered statutory subject matter. The Federal Circuit posed
the question as “how long must a new and useful compound, which can
47. A detailed discussion of the patentability of biotechnology inventions has been published
in IVER P. COOPER, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW (West Group, 2001). See also KENNETH J.
BURCHFIELD, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT (BNA Books, 1995).
48. See Arrhythmia Res. Tech. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(Rader, J., concurring).
49. “The Patent and Trademark Office now considers non-naturally occurring non-human
multicellular living organisms including animals, to be patentable subject matter within the scope
of 35 U.S.C. Section 101.” 1077 O.G. 24 (April 21, 1987). U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (Leder et al.)
(issued April 12, 1988).
50. U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (Leder et al.) (issued April 12, 1988).
51. Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA), 46 Stat. 376; The Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 §
42, 84 Stat. 1542, amended by 1994 Amendments, Publ. L. No. 103-349, § 3, 108 Stat. 3138, 7
U.S.C. § 2402(a) (2002)
52. Ex parte Hibbard, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443 (B.P.A.I. 1985).
53. Pioneer Hi-Bred. Inc. v. J.E.M. Agric. Supply, Inc., 200 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
54. Id.
55. In re Breslow, 616 F.2d 516 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
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be made at will for its intended purpose, . . . exist to be considered as a
‘composition of matter’ under 35 U.S.C. § 101?”56 The court disagreed
with the PTO’s attempt to “read into 35 U.S.C. § 101 a requirement that
composition of matter must be stable.”57 This decision is consistent with
decisions in other technology areas, where courts have broadly
interpreted the Patent Act and refused to insert express limitations in
considering what may potentially be statutory subject matter.
VI. THE FUTURE
The Patent Act has served admirably well in permitting the
continued expansion of statutory subject matter over the last 50 years
and will presumably continue to do so without the need for significant
change in the future. The strength of the Patent Act has been its lack of
specific exclusionary limitations, thereby permitting broad discretion in
judicial interpretation. The existing language of the Patent Act and the
history of judicial interpretation, as well as recent PTO administrative
guidelines, should result in continued expansion in what will be deemed
patentable subject matter. Based on this history, there appears to be no
compelling reason why future patentable subject matter in any
technology area cannot be addressed under the current statutory
provision.
As new technologies emerge, the PTO and the courts will need to
address each new subject matter with an open mind. The biggest
problem in this regard, however, may be that new technologies can raise
previously unencountered ethical, moral, economic and public policy
issues that are analytically unrelated to a construction of the Patent Act
but tend to “muddy” the analysis.58 It is essentially impossible to
anticipate specific issues in advance because an invention is frequently
the creation of something previously unimaginable. Unimaginable
things can create previously unimaginable issues for society.
New issues relating to potential statutory subject matter may
overlap into the arena of what should be patented, rather than what is
actually patentable under the Patent Act. In theory, such issues should
not affect the patent examination process or a court’s determination of
what is statutory subject matter. Of course, the reality of the situation
may ultimately be dictated by public policy concerns.
As new technologies arise, they will need to be addressed on an
56. Id at 519.
57. Id. at 521.
58. Such an example might arise if someone tried to patent a cloned human being.
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individual and innovative basis. For example, the PTO issued a patent to
a surgical method, thereby placing methods of practicing medicine into
the statutory category. Shortly thereafter, questions occurred from
health practitioners to Congress concerning their ability to treat their
patients without being sued for infringement. The easiest solution might
have been for either the courts or Congress to exclude such “surgical
methods” from the category of statutory subject matter. Instead,
Congress provided a limited exemption from infringement liability to
address the concerns of such health practitioners without changing the
definition of patentable subject matter.
This congressional remedy was a new provision in the Patent Act59
that permitted health practitioners and health care facilities to engage in
“medical activity”60 that infringed a patent without being sued for
infringement.61 Therefore, one need not necessarily restrict the
categories of statutory matter in order to address possible complications
arising from new technologies.
Another controversial statutory subject matter issue involves
bioinformatics data that results from using sophisticated computer
software to analyze biological research problems. In this scenario, an
inventor might mine a database of information regarding proteins or
nucleic acids and arrive at a “virtual structure”62 having specific
characteristics of interest. Under current interpretations of § 101, the
raw database and the derived virtual structures cannot be patented, but if
the virtual structure is actually converted into a physical structure, it
becomes patentable subject matter. The problem with this current
limitation is that much of the commercial investment, and resulting
economic value, exists in the database itself and the virtual structures
prior to any creation of the actual physical structure. One can argue that
if patent protection were provided to the database itself, or the more
limited area of the virtual structures, advances in technology would be
facilitated, business would benefit and the valuable database itself would
59. 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2001). The Act reads in part:
(c)(1)With respect to medical practitioner’s performance of a medical activity that
constitutes an infringement under section 271(a) or (b) or this title, the provisions of
sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 of this title shall not apply against the medical
practitioner or against a related health care entity with respect to such medical activity.
Id.
60. The amendment defined “medical activity” narrowly to encompass only “performance of
a medical or surgical procedure on a body.” 35 U.S. § 287(c)(2)(A).
61. Of course, the practical result of this exemption to infringement may have been to
significantly decrease the value of any patent issuing to such a surgical procedure.
62. In this context the “virtual structure” is a theoretical one that can be described in detail
with respect to its structure and functional characteristics.
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be disseminated more quickly into the public domain, thus preventing
unnecessary research duplication. 63 Others might argue that allowing
patent protection of data itself or virtual inventions would transform the
Patent Act into an Intellectual Property Protection Act with undesirable
consequences. This debate is likely to become more intense as
bioinformatics data becomes more prevalent in the research arena.
Another topic recently discussed in the scientific press involves
man-made devices that can by themselves “invent” new devices. In one
publication this concept was referred to as “genetic programming.”64 Is
such a machine-created invention within the bounds of statutory subject
matter? If so, who is the “inventor”? These and other questions wait for
answers. Needless to say, however, it is certain that there will be many
other such new technologies that will need to be addressed in the next
decade as to whether they constitute statutory subject matter under the
Patent Act.

63. Under current law the database and virtual structures could be protected as trade secrets,
but that avenue does not provide the facilitation of improvements that the patent system does.
64. See John R. Koza, Martin A. Keane & Matthew J. Steeler, Evolving Inventions,
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Feb. 2003, at 52. At page 54 of this article, it is claimed that the authors
have already filed for a patent on “a genetically evolved general-purpose controller that is superior
to mathematically derived controllers commonly used in industry.” Id. at 54. The authors
apparently used the adjective “genetic” because the controller “evolved” from a machine process in
a manner analogous to Darwin’s concept of genetic evolution. See id.
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TABLE 1 - DECISIONS RELATING TO EXPANSION OF
STATUTORY SUBJECT MATTER
Decision

Comments

Invention

Ex parte Scherer,
103 U.S.P.Q. 107
(B.P.A.I. 1954).
In re Jones,
373 F.2d 1007, 153
U.S.P.Q. 77 (C.C.P.A.
1967).
Gottscchalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63, 175
U.S.P.Q. 673 (1972).
In re Johnston,
502 F.2d 765, 183
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 172
(C.C.P.A. 1974).
In re Venezia,
530 F.2d 956, 189
U.S.P.Q. 149 (C.C.P.A.
1976).
Parker v. Flook,
437 U.S. 584, 198
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193
(1981).
In re Kratz,
592 F.2d 1169, 201
U.S.P.Q. 71 (CCPA
1979).
Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. 303, 206
U.S.P.Q. 193 (1980).
In re Breslow,
616 F.2d 516, 205
U.S.P.Q. 221 (C.C.P.A.
1980).

Overruled examiner’s
decision preventing
patentability.
Distinguished printed
matter as a component
of a machine.

Medical treatment
claims.
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Eliminated patent
protection for computer
software.
The claimed machine
was within the
technological art.

Code member with
printed lines as part
of an optical reader
rotating disc.
Computer soft-ware
per se (program for
data processing).
Record-keeping
machine system.

Group of interrelated
parts was a
manufacture.

Kit with com-ponent
parts, assembled in
the field.

Process was not
patentable.

Process using mathematical formula
and a programmed
digital computer.
Process-product
imparting a strawberry flavor by adding certain acids.
Genetically-altered,
live microorganism
(oil eating bacteria).
Intermediary or
transitory product
(composition).

Alteration to products
from natural state –
manufacture.
Anything under the sun
that is made by man.
Court rejected the idea
that an unstable, intermediate or transitory
product did not constitute a composition
under §101.
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Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175, 209
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1
(1981).

In re Gulack,
703 F.2d 1381, 217
U.S.P.Q. 401 (Fed.
Cir.1983).
Ex parte Allen,
2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425
(B.P.A.I. 1987).
In re Lowry,
32 F.3d 1579, 32
U.S.P.Q.2d 1031 (Fed.
Cir 1994).
In re Beauregard,
53 F.3d 1583, 35
U.S.P.Q.2d 1383 (Fed.
Cir. 1985).
State St. Bank & Trust v.
Signature Fin. Group,
149 F.3d 1368, 47
U.S.P.Q. 1596 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
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Court confirmed the
patentability of an
industrial process that
included the use of a
mathematical formula
and a computer as one
of its steps.
Printed matter issue.

PTO extended protection to a multi-cellular
organism that is nonnaturally occurring.
The invention was not
printed matter.

Computer program embodied in tangible medium such as a floppy
disc was patentable.
Determination of
statutory subject matter
should not turn on
whether the invention
does “business” rather
than something else.

229

Process (method of
operating a rubber
molding press)
including a mathematical formula
and a computer.
Device with a series
of numbers functionally related to a
ring.
Altered oysters (product by process).

Data structure for
storing, using and
managing data in a
computer memory.
Tangible media with
computer implemented method
embedded within.
Data processing
system for making
necessary daily
calculations.
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